Discussion of the rise of China, India and Asia usually ends with the possibility of a new superpower emerging to challenge or even displace US hegemony. The analysis surrounding such a discussion often seems simplistic and the possibility of such a development is often exaggerated. More importantly, the discussion itself seems to misunderstand the real changes taking place in the international system. In this two part series we will look at China emerging as a recognizable superpower. Next, we will consider how China might actually be emerging.
Setting aside questions about what would qualify as evidence of China’s new superpower status, a sobering bucket of cold water can be dumped on assessments of China’s current national power through a comprehensive summary of the country’s many weaknesses.
The first weakness could be, surprisingly, one of willpower. To be a superpower, if we understand that to be what the US itself and its political-economic model abroad were in the way that the US, the USSR and, in fact, the People’s Republic of China committed to doing so for much of the Cold War. China still prioritizes its domestic agenda. In fact, the main concern of the Chinese Communist Party is inherently internal, which is to preserve its own power. This is a defensive position that does not seem to fit with the notion of a superpower’s desire to impose its belief system on others.
Another sign of weakness is the elite’s apparent lack of faith in China. Bo Xilai, the former mayor of Chongqing now imprisoned and under official investigation, was an example of this. A preference for overseas assets and children educated in the various elite Western educational institutions does not suggest confidence in either China’s present or future. The fact that this arrangement is a basic goal of all middle-class Chinese and would-be elites further underscores the lack of faith in China and, again, suggests more than the supreme self-confidence of a genuine superpower.
A general mistrust of the outside world and a powerful victim mentality that gives China a tendency to blame others for its problems would also seem to mitigate any sense that China is an emerging superpower. This is rooted in a sense of history which, as officially promoted, reveals that a once glorious, benign and tolerant empire suffered great humiliation at the hands of ruthless expansive foreign powers by virtue of its acquisition of advanced technology. . This view of history leaves China with a blind spot on how it is perceived by others, sometimes also as aggressive, expansive and intimidating. This sense of outrage gives China a particularly strident and self-righteous tone in pursuing its claims. In the South China Sea, for example, this makes it increasingly difficult to speak rationally with those who question China’s claims and, perhaps worse, creates enormous domestic political pressure to take a hard line, for China to not be seen once again as weak or embarrassed by foreign powers.
China’s problem in attracting serious allies must also be seen as a factor undermining its international power. In the early and mid-20th century, as British power waned, it actively sought to soften the US assumption of its former hegemonic role, generally hoping that this would mean the continuation of a system beneficial to it. Europe as a whole has also long sought to cooperate with US power. China simply does not have the same appeal to other major powers in the international arena, and is more likely to exasperate than inspire admiration. Of course, the US has cooperated with China’s rise so far, but that is on the condition that China does not challenge its direct interests. It is still the US that educates the world’s elite in its universities, granting it an unparalleled cultural power with which China is far from competing. China simply does not offer an attractive alternative view of the world for global elites to embrace.
Another major weakness could be classified as broadly economic. This may seem surprising considering how dynamic China is today compared to most of the rest of the world. However, this broad category must include the long-term economic crises that are brewing in China, such as the massive environmental damage it has already suffered but has not been accounted for, and the environmental damage that is yet to come due to the model that is currently deployed and will likely persist for some time. I like. Another major economic problem that China will face will be its changing demographics as it becomes an aging country with a massive dependent and unproductive elderly population in the 2020s. The large pool of labor that has supported China’s growth will be will be greatly diminished, and even less likely to follow the higher-consumption lifestyle that economists and the government know is necessary to rebalance the economy. The reality of the current difficulties of this rebalancing, the massive financial inefficiencies supporting the economic system as it stands, and the huge industrial and manufacturing overcapacity is another weakness, outlined on this site by Paul Harding.
This same discussion is based on the idea that it is normal to have one or two superpowers that define the main international problems. However, although history inclines us to look for patterns, it does not evolve in predictable cycles. Many of the issues noted above that would seem to work against a conclusion for China to emerge as a new superpower, at the same time seem somewhat tied to a very 20th-century view of international relations. It is still possible that a new paradigm will emerge. China is highly unlikely to emerge as a US- or Soviet-style superpower, but at the same time it is contributing to a massive transformation of global power dynamics. The power of the United States in all spheres, and the economic and commercial power of Europe, are in relative decline vis-à-vis the various large and fast-growing economies of the developing world. An underestimated difference between our century and the previous one will also be the power of non-state actors, corporations and the like. The decline of the US causes anxiety, leading to discussion of potential new superpowers, and China will certainly be a massive part of any new structure, but it is only one aspect of a much more complex and multipolar picture. What follows is rarely what came before and China is a symbol of this changing world. However, it will not set global agendas or make unilateral military commitments abroad in the style of Moscow and Washington during the Cold War.
The next article in this series will consider what China is becoming, if not the superpower state as we understand that term. It will be argued that China is much more defensive and insecure than is commonly portrayed. China’s main concern is not to install a global hegemony but to assert its independence from the domination that the West has exercised over the international system for the past two hundred years.
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